Introduction
Sometimes the most simple questions prove the most vexing. For example, what does your government hope to achieve through its government procurement law? It is possible to draft and enact a new law without answering the question, and experience demonstrates that this is often the case. (Arguably, it is equally challenging to sustain a commitment to these objectives over time, but that is a topic for another day.) Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to attempt to describe general aspirations for a procurement system before drafting begins.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to articulate objectives for a procurement system. 1 There are many options, and most are c ontradi ctory. 2 This paper will briefly address nine goals frequently 4 We believe the marketplace thrives because of human self-interest, which proves far more effective than legislated or regulated mandates or policies. As Adam Smith wrote over two hundred years ago:
[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of society as great as he can. He generally neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (ed. Edwinn Canaan, University of Chicago Press, 1976) pp.477. See also, Helen Joyce, "Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand," Math.Plus, at http://plus.maths.org/issue14/features/smith/index.html.
The system in which the invisible hand is most often assumed to work is the free market. Adam Smith assumed that consumers choose for the lowest price, and that entrepreneurs choose for the highest rate of profit. He asserted that by thus making their excess or insufficient demand known through market prices, consumers "directed" entrepreneurs' investment money to the most profitable industry. Remember that this is the industry producing the goods most highly valued by consumers, so in general economic well-being is increased. award of our contracts; and it treats all contractors in a manner that balances appropriate risks with meaningful profit incentives and rewards. There are plentiful exceptions to this description, and a number are identified below.
We promote competition because we believe in the power of the marketplace. 4 By maximizing the effective use of competition, the government receives its best value in terms of price, quality, and contract terms and conditions. 5 Contractor motivation to excel is greatest when private companies, driven by a profit motive, compete head-to-head in seeking to obtain
work. Yet, maintaining a robust competitive regime requires more than a commitment to the 7 An extensive statutory and regulatory construct is intended to limit both actual and apparent conflicts of interests involving government procurement officials. See 48 C.F.R. § 3.1. See also, generally 18 U.S.C. § 201, discussing gratuities and bribes. It is unlawful to offer, give, solicit or accept gifts (or things of value) to or by government employees. "Gift includes any gratuity, favor, discount, entertainment, hospitality, loan, forbearance, or other item having monetary value." 5 C.F.R. § 2635.503 (emphasis in original). The same regulations define "prohibited source" as "any person who: (2) Does business or seeks to do business with the employee's agency . . . marketplace. Accordingly, we promote and sustain contractor participation by instilling integrity and transparency into the system. By use of the word integrity, we mean to describe rules of conduct for procurement pers onnel in the gov ernm ent and private industry.
6 Bribery, favouritism, or unethical behaviour have no place in a successful procurement system. 7 Our regulatory mandate is clear:
Government business shall be conducted in a manner above reproach and . . . with complete impartiality and with preferential treatment for none. Transactions relating to the expenditure of public funds require the highest degree of public trust and an impeccable standard of conduct. The general rule is to avoid strictly any conflict of interest or even the appearance of a conflict of interest in Government-contractor relationships. While many Federal laws and regulations place restrictions on the actions of Government personnel, their official conduct must, in addition, be such that they would have no reluctance to make a full public disclosure of their actions. 9 The need for oversight of the procurement system implicates issues far broader than minimizing the frequency of collusion or incidence of fraud. This is not to suggest that elimination of fraud and collusion is not important -it is. Rather, it reflects the existence of an over-arching compliance regime, predicated upon an intricate web of statutory and regulatory requirements that define the procurement system. Our rule-bound regime reflects thoroughly western values and judgements regarding ethics, and many nations would argue that we cast our net too broadly in describing corruption. See Kenneth U. Surjadinata, "Comment: Revisiting Corrupt Practices from a Market Perspective", 12 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1021, 1026 (1998) (arguing, inter alia, that developing states see the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act "as a culturally arrogant encroachment on their ability to govern activities exclusively within their borders, in accordance with international law principles on territorial sovereignty."). In procurement, compliance indicates not just high standards of integrity, but also the maintenance of system transparency, the maximization of competition, and the furtherance of a host of Congressionally mandated social policies. Any one of these issues opens to door to a host of pitfalls. For example, integrity in public procurement implicates issues related to, inter alia, personal and organizational conflicts of interest, gratuities, bribes, handling and disclosure of proprietary source selection information, contractor certification of compliance with numerous social programs (such as contractor size status, disclosure of cost or pricing data, or origin of end products delivered), contractor maintenance of a drug-free workplace, contractor allocation fo specified unallowable costs to specific pools, appropriate supervision and cooperation by government employees, proper use by contractors of mandated supplies or raw materials, faithful execution by contractors of inspection and testing provisions, etcetera. Despite the complexity of the Federal procurement system and the reality that this complexity subjects the system to criticism, the statutory and regulatory regime is intended to hold contractors or government personnel accountable for compliance with Congressional mandates.
ensure[s] that procurement decisions are based only on considerations regarded as 'legitimate' withi n the system. . . [It also] supports the goals of procurement systems by encouraging and facilitating participation by suppliers. Publicity for procurement opportunities, the application of clear and accessible rules, and the assurance that these rules will be adhered to all mean that suppliers are more willing and able to bid. There is less risk that their participation will prove wasteful. . . . the affected parties clearly know both the rules to be applied in conducting procurements as well as information on specific procurement opportunities.
11 Transparency is maintained in many ways. We publish all of the statutes, regulations, and rules that define our procurement process.
12
We announce our government's requirements -what we expect to purchase -for all the world to see. 13 We clearly articulate in every solicitation how offerors will be evaluated. We notify all of the unsuccessful offerors (and members of the public who request the information) which offeror received the award and for what amount. We debrief unsuccessful offerors and explain to them how all of the rules and regulations were followed. 14 16 Protest procedures can benefit both the parties involved and the procurement system in general.
When the Congress has laid down guidelines to be followed in carrying out its mandate in a specific area, there should be some procedure whereby those who are injured by the arbitrary or capricious action of a governmental agency or official in ignoring those procedures can vindicate their very real interests, while at the same time furthering the public interest. . . . (1943) . The court further articulated that: "The public interest in preventing the granting of contracts through arbitrary or capricious action can properly be vindicated through a suit brought by one who suffers injury as a result of the illegal activity, but the suit itself is brought in the public interest by one acting essentially as a "private attorney general." 424 F.2d at 864. The court adopts the "view . . . that government officers were making contracts on behalf of the government, that Congress is also a participant in the exercise of the government's proprietary functions, and that the most practicable way to keep the government's contracting officers within their statutory powers is by letting complainants . . . obtain judicial review of the officers' action." 424 F.2d at 866, citing, 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 220 (1958). Finally, the court summarized that: "If there is arbitrary or capricious action on the part of any contracting official, who is going to complain about it, if not the party denied a contract as a result of the alleged illegal activity? It seems to us that it will be a very healthy check on governmental action to allow such suits . . . as a watchdog of government activity. . . ." 424 F.2d at 866-67. 17 The Inspectors General are expected, among other things, to (1) conduct and supervise audits and investigat ions, (2) recom mend policies for activities design ed to promote economy, (continued In fact, there is at least one instance where Congress has legislated that administrative efficiency is not an absolute priority. "The reduction of administrative or personnel costs alone shall not be a justification for bundling of contract requirements unless the cost savings are expected to be substantial in relation to the dollar value of the procurement requirements to be consolidated." 15 U.S.C. § 644(e)(2)(C)(emphasis added).
22
To determine program efficiency, an organization would simply measure the cost per mile swept. But to determine policy efficiency, it would have to measure the cost to achieve a desired level of street cleanliness, by whatever method -street sweeping, prevention, community self-help. Finally, to measure program effectiveness, a city might measure citizen satisfaction with the level of street cleanliness. But to measure policy effectiveness, it might ask citizens whether they wanted their money spent keeping the streets clean, or whether alternative uses, such as construction or repaving, would be preferable. Because of the ethical views that prevail . . . , because efficiency is generally regarded as something desirable, the word is a political symbol of considerable potency. It has the power of organizing sentiment behind the proposals to which it is attached. Most people feel they ought to be efficient, and that they ought to want efficient government.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many debates in our political scene about "efficiency" are really debates about what values government should implement.
Ibid. at 510-11 (emphasis in original).
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thwart effi ciency. 21 Yet in any transaction involving commerce, efficiency plays an important role. When we talk about efficiency in this context, we focus primarily upon administrative or transactional efficiency (although the concept could be applied in a far broader context). 22 In 23 The present political climate in the United States reflects a seemingly mindless obsession with reducing the size of the Federal workforce. See generally, Vice President Al Gore, The Best Kept Secrets in Government: A Report to President Bill Clinton 1, 207 (GPO, 1996) (reflecting that the Executive Branch, excluding the independent Postal Service, has "the smallest workforce in 30 years"). One of the related by-products of this effort is increasing pressure to contract out traditional government services. Without addressing the risks associated with contracting out or privatizing inherently governmental functions, this pressure results in increased costs. We also have increased our emphasis upon the concept of best value 25 , or what some call value for money. 26 In other words, we aspire to focus upon getting the best deal -or the best bargain -for the public's money. Such an emphasis seems logical. Unfortunately, the pursuit of best value typically requires greater buyer resources, from market research to negotiation.
Similarly, obtaining best value may not always please the customer (for example, if the customer requires premium quality regardless of price).
Also, in the 1990's, the U.S. procurement system increased its emphasis on obtaining customer satisfaction for end users. It makes sense for buyers to try to please those for whom they serve. Unfortunately, pleasing end users, especially if the end user favours specific suppliers or demands that goods be provided quickly, frequently results in less competition and higher prices, 27 or simply embarrassing policy decisions. 28 The author does not believe that wealth distribution is one of the procurement system's primary goals. This does not suggest that the Congress does not use the procurement system to attempt to redistribute wealth. But those efforts are transitory for the same reasons they are controversial. Two examples demonstrate the never-ending turbulence affecting social policies. 3, 1999) . Moreover, wealth distribution is merely a subset of the larger phenomenon of burdening the procurement process (or, for that matter, the process of governing) with efforts to promote social policies. These social policies, in addition to those that potentially distribute wealth to domestic manufacturers, essential military suppliers, and small (and small disadvantaged and women-owned) businesses, also mandate drug-free workplaces, occupational safety standards, compliance with labor laws, preferences for environmentally friendly purchasing practices, etcetera. Accordingly, while the author concedes that Congressional manipulation of the procurement process is a significant aspect or feature of the system, the author cannot agree that wealth distribution is a fundamental purpose of the procurement regime. Historically, our elected representatives have viewed our procurement system as a vehicle to distribute wealth. 28 For example, our government has chosen to leverage its purchases to support domestic firms and, more specifically, small businesses. 29 At the same time, our
These goals are often regarded as illegitimate by people inside the system because they have no direct bearing on national security or on acquisition. Indeed, they look like the workings of powerful special interests trying to bend society's rules in their favor. However, democracy is a messy form of government. One pers on's selfish speci al interest is another's vital national priority. 31 To be determined responsible, a contractor must have adequate financial resources; be able to comply with the required schedule; have a satisfactory performance record; have a (continued...) It is difficult to describe a procurement regime without acknowledging the role of risk avoidance. Avoiding undue risk is a fundamental responsibility of any governing body.
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Conversely, improper obsession with risk avoidance can suffocate creativity, stifle innovation and render and institution ineffective. Further, there are infinite mechanisms available to control different types of risk. For example, in the United States, the concept of responsibility is used to filter out undesirable or incompetent contractors. 31 The manner in which the government's needs 31 (...continued) satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics; have the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operational controls, and technical skills; have the necessary production, equipment and facilities; and be otherwise qualified and eligible under applicable laws and regulations. 48 C.F.R. § 9.104-1. 32 Different types of contracts -ranging from firm fixed price to cost reimbursement vehicles -modulate the government's exposure to potential cost overruns. 33 In addition, the termination for convenience clause permits the government to avoid performance where its need for the contracted items has evaporated or been overtaken by events.
34
Finally, another valuable systemic goal is frequently lost in efforts to achieve some or all of the previously discussed policies. Nonetheless, the importance of uniformity, particularly in maximizing transparency, competition, and efficiency, among others, cannot be overstated. A uniform procurement system suggests that all gov ernm ent instrumentalities buy the sam e way, following the same laws, rules, and practices. Such a system is efficient because sellers do not need to learn new rules in order to do business with different agencies or departments. Further, it is much easier to train all of the government's buyers, and it permits buyers greater flexibility to work for various agencies or departments during their careers. In addition, if the government
The nature and quality of regulatory practice hinges on which laws regulators choose to enforce, and when; on how they focus their efforts and structure their uses of discretion; on their choice of methods for procuring compliance. Transactions become more routine. All parties to the transaction understand the rules to the game.
Conclusion
Ultimately, each government must decide how much discretion or flexibility it wishes to delegate to its buyers. 37 No system can achieve all of these goals. Nor can a state expect that its objectives for its system will remain constant over time. Determining which goals are most important is a daunting, ever-evolving challenge.
Because no system can achieve all of the goals here (or the many not discussed), your desiderata entails important tradeoffs. There are significant transactional, economic, and social costs associated with maximizing transparency, integrity, and competition. Nonetheless, the author believes these costs are an excellent long-term investment.
